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INJURY AND EXASPERATION: AN 
EXAMINATION OF HARM TO OTHERS 
AND OFFENSE TO OTHERS 
Andrew von Hirsch* 
HARM TO OTHERS. By Joel Feinberg. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 1984. Pp. xiii, 269. $29.95. 
OFFENSE TO OTHERS. By Joel Feinberg. New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 1985. Pp. xix, 328. $29.95. 
Notions most often spoken of can receive the least careful scrutiny. 
So it has been with harm and offense. Since John Stuart Mill, a vast 
literature has accumulated on whether harm to others should be the 
sole basis for state compulsion or whether offense to others or self-
harm can also be legitimate grounds. But what, exactly, is meant by 
"harm" and "offense"? Those critical questions of definition remained 
unaddressed. , · 
Now comes the first sustained effort to investigate harm, offense, 
and allied notions, by one of this country's leading philosophers of 
law, Joel Feinberg. His effort is ambitious indeed, taking the form of a 
four-volume work entitled The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. 
The first two volumes deal with harm to others and offense to others, 
respectively. It is these I address herein. Two volumes have yet to 
appear: one on harm to self, 1 and the other on nonharmful kinds of 
supposed immorality.2 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of Feinberg's undertak-
ing. One simply cannot make sense of many criminal law issues with-
out an understanding of whether and why conduct is injurious or 
obnoxious. Feinberg helps us begin to understand. Recently, I had 
occasion to write a work on sentencing policy; its most troublesome 
task, perhaps, was gauging the seriousness of crimes. 3 Seriousness de-
pends, in part, on the degree of harmfulness of the criminal conduct, 
but there was scant literature on harmfulness to turn to. Fortunately, 
* Professor, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University. A.B., LL.B., Harvard Univer-
sity. Professor von Hirsch is author of DOING JUSTICE (1976) and PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES 
(1985). - Ed. I am indebted to John Kleninig, Nils Jareborg, and David A.J. Richards for their 
helpful comments. 
1. J. FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (forthcoming). 
2. J. FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (forthcoming). 
3. A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN 
THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 63-76 (1985). 
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Feinberg's first volume appeared while I was at work - and his dis-
cussion of degrees of harm proved most helpful. Others dealing with 
criminal jurisprudence and related questions will likewise find them-
selves enlightened by Feinberg's analysis. ·· 
I 
Feinberg begins Harm to Others with an analysis of what "harm-
ing" means. Harm is an intrusion into an interest that someone has. 
A person has a variety of interests, physical integrity and property 
being only the most familiar. An interest, according to Feinberg, is 
something the person has a stake in (pp. 33-34). A person has a stake 
in something when he stands to gain or lose depending on its condi-
tion. The stake has to be a relatively stable and deep-rooted concern, 
whose achievement the person can reasonably hope for. One ha~ a 
stake in an adequate diet and a job, but merely a wish of the moment 
for pistachio ice cream and a longing, perhaps, to be President (pp. 41-
45). This definition seems elementary enough, but it has usefulness: it 
permits harms to be assessed and compared by examining the type and 
importance of the interests that are invaded. 
An interest, however, strikes me as being more than a stable, rea-
sonably hoped-for want. The idea of a "stake," on which Feinberg 
relies, has stronger connotations: something that has been or is the 
person's own. My stake in an enterprise or horse race is the money 
that I put into it, and I am harmed if I lose it. My stake does not 
include large additional sums I might win, even if those winnings are 
much hoped for and the odds are favorable. 
An interest thus involves the idea of expectation in a normative 
and not purely predictive sense. To assert I have an interest in X en-
tails not only that X would benefit me but that Xis something that I or 
persons like me have some colorable claim to. That claim is prima 
facie only: it is not yet a moral entitlement, or a legal right. Among 
the various interests people have, some may warrant the law's protec-
tion and others not. Deciding which interests should have protection 
is a major issue of legal policy. But having an interest at least raises 
the question: why shouldn't that interest be protected? Offense differs 
from harm, as we shall see, in that no interest - no stake - is in-
volved. By being offended, it is not obvious that the person loses any-
thing he might have a claim to. That makes the case for responding to 
offense more tenuous. 
If an interest is something more than a stable want, harming is 
something less than culpable wrongdoing. I commit a culpable wrong 
against you only if I (1) harm you by setting back an interest of yours 
(2) which is also your right, (3) without justification, (4) under circum-
stances in which I personally am at fault for having done so. While 
Feinberg initially defines harm as a setback of interests, he later revises 
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his definition so as to eliminate these distinctions between harming, 
wronging, and being at fault. Harm, he then asserts, constitutes a 
wrongful and unexcused invasion of interest (pp. 105-06). Feinberg is 
led to this by the scope of his inquiry: his books concern the scope of 
the criminal law (pp. 19-25), and criminal liability has to do with cul-
pable misconduct. 
This revised definition is, in my judgment, unhelpful - for it bi-
ases the state's response toward the criminal law. When harm is iden-
tified as a culpable invasion of a protected interest, then the conduct 
either is reprehensible and warrants a criminal sanction or else is not 
harmful and calls for no response. Separating harm from wrongdoing 
and from culpability would help avoid this bias. A determination that 
someone has been harmed - that his interests have been set back -
would be a reason for a state response, but its kind would still be open 
for discussion. Punishment is a particularly onerous species of inter-
vention, both in its potential deprivations and in the stigma of blame it 
carries. Even when harm is done and a state response seems war-
ranted, therefore, invoking the criminal law should require its own 
justification - that there is something presumptively reprehensible 
about inflicting this kind of harm, and that the harm was wrought 
through the actor's fault. 4 Absent these added elements, there still 
may be harm to be remedied~ but the remedy should be sought other 
than via the criminal law. 
Melding harm with culpable wrongdoing also has another draw-
back: it tends to deflect attention from principles of culpability in the 
criminal law. We see this in Feinberg's own account. His topic is 
harm. He briefly lists the elements of culpability - intent, reckless-
ness, negligence, absence of excuse - in his revised definition of harm 
(pp. 105-06). But then he has nothing more to say about these ele-
ments. Questions of culpability are, however, at least as complex and 
at least as demanding of analysis as questions of the injuriousness of 
conduct. More is involved than the familiar categories of intent, reck-
lessness, negligence, and full excuse that Feinberg mentions. Ques-
tions of diminished culpability (which arise, for example, in situations 
of provocation) need to be considered also.5 Culpability must be ad-
dressed separately to have the visibility that it needs for adequate 
analysis. 
II 
Let me tum next to the portion of Harm to Others I found the 
most interesting: Feinberg's discussion of degrees of harm. Since his 
four volumes deal with the limits of the criminal law, he examines this 
4. See also Kleinig, Criminally Harming Others, 5 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS (forthcoming). 
5. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 3, at 71-74; see also von Hirsch & Jareborg, Provocation 
and Culpability, in NEW DIRECTIONS ON RESPONSIBILITY (F. Schoeman ed.) (forthcoming). 
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issue in order to determine whether conduct is sufficiently injurious to 
warrant being criminalized at all (pp. 188-90). However, his discus-
sion can also be applied to sentencing policy, as I mentioned at the 
outset.6 
Harms may invade different interests. Car theft entails a substan-
tial property loss; armed robbery typically involves a smaller pecuni-
ary loss but a threat to life. Most of us would rate armed robbery as 
more harmful, because we consider the interest in physical integrity 
more important than that in common items of property. Sometimes, 
however, property loss can seem very serious, as when one is swindled 
out of one's life savings. What is needed, therefore, is a theory that 
explains why a particular interest should be considered more impor-
tant than another. 
Feinberg offers a threefold grading criterion. The importance of 
any given interest, he suggests, depends on whether it constitutes a 
welfare interest, security interest, or accumulative interest. 
Welfare interests rank highest. These are the concerns that per-
sons need satisfied in order to have any significant capacity to engage 
in their chosen pursuits. They constitute, in Feinberg's words, the 
"generalized means, often indispensable ones, to the advancement of 
[a person's] more ulterior interests" (p. 42). When these interests are 
compromised, the person is foreclosed from almost any activity. Up 
to a certain point, both physical integrity and property constitute wel-
fare interests. That point is defined by the tolerable minimum of these 
concerns that is needed in order for a person to go about his affairs. A 
person requires a certain minimum of physical well-being to undertake 
anything else. He likewise needs a certain tolerable minimum of eco-
nomic support, or else he is debilitated. However, it is only a limited 
subcategory of property that thus qualifies: preserving a means of live-
lihood is a welfare interest, but owning a Maserati is not. 
Ranking next, of intermediate importance, are what Feinberg 
terms "security interest[s] ... cushioning [a] welfare interest" (p. 207). 
Beyond the bare minimum of health and economic well-being required 
to pursue his aims, a person requires a certain additional safety mar-
gin. Without that margin, the person may be able to function, but 
only barely so - and with much reason for apprehension. Freedom 
from common physical assaults is an example of this kind of interest: 
such assaults do not threaten one's existence, but do compromise one's 
sense of elementary security. ' 
Below the welfare and security interests rank the "accumulative 
interests" (p. 207). These are the nonessential interests people have in 
the various good things of life. An enjoyable existence involves these 
various concerns, be they in goods, leisure, or whatever. Common 
6. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 3, at 63-76. 
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theft offenses, for example, typically and foreseeably deprive a person 
neither of his minimum livelihood nor of the margin of security above 
that minimum. They invade his accumulative interests. 
The three categories are far from precise, but are helpful because 
they provide a common standard for judging invasions of different 
kinds of interests. A ranking of harms is not, of course, sufficient to 
gauge the seriousness of crimes - questions of culpability need still to 
be considered. A negligent invasion of a welfare interest may be no 
more serious than an intentional invasion of a security interest. But 
half, if not all, of the job of rating crimes' seriousness involves assess-
ing the gravity of harms. 
Useful as Feinberg's classifications may be, the question that keeps 
nagging the reader (or at least this reader) is why these particular clas-
sifications are appropriate. What is the rationale underlying his idea 
of welfare interests? Is it a notion of the person's survival or subsis-
tence? Or is something more involved? Feinberg chooses not to ad-
dress this issue. He simply describes the concept of a welfare interest, 
and leaves the appropriateness of his classifications to the reader's 
judgment. At the outset of Harm to Others (pp. 17-18), he says he 
does not wish to link his proposed conceptions of harm with any single 
general moral theory. 
At first glance, a subsistence rationale for his classification of inter-
ests seems plausible. The welfare interests in physical security and 
livelihood are, indeed, necessary for the person's survival. This seems 
uncontroversial: would not any legal system give highest priority to 
those victims' interests that are essential for living? This rationale, 
however, does not stand up to closer scrutiny. 
Mere subsistence would yield a list of welfare interests much nar-
rower than that which Feinberg proposes.7 Interests in personal lib-
erty, in particular, would be excluded. An unfree life may not be 
pleasant, but millions survive throughout the world in authoritarian 
systems. Feinberg argues at one point that deprivation of liberty 
makes the person lose dignity and moral responsibility (pp. 211-12). 
This may be morally deadening, but one does not actually die of being 
bossed about. 
The idea of choice is central to Feinberg's definition of welfare in-
terests, when that definition is examined more closely. Welfare inter-
ests are those concerns that a person needs preserved in order to 
choose and pursue his ulterior goals (pp. 37-38). Welfare interests 
have their high ranking of importance precisely because they are pre-
7. Feinberg lists as welfare interests "the interests in the continuance for a foreseeable inter· 
val of one's life and the interests in one's own physical health and vigor, ... minimal intellectual 
acuity, emotional stability, ... the capacity to engage normally in social intercourse and to enjoy 
and maintain friendships, at least minimal income and financial security, a tolerable social and 
physical environment, and a certain amount of freedom from interference and coercion." P. 3 7. 
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requisite to whatever mode of life the person may wish to achieve. 8 
The underlying idea, I would suggest, is thus connected with per-
sonal autonomy. Individuals should be entitled to decide for them-
selves which interests are most important in their lives. A theory of 
harm should make allowances for differences in how people value life's 
goods. It should not elevate one set of possible focal aims above an-
other set, because that is for the person himself to choose. The attrac-
tion of the concept of a welfare interest lies precisely in its pluralism: 
welfare interests are those necessary for whatever more ultimate aims 
the person may select. Such a rationale explains why a minimum of 
political liberty is a welfare interest.9 It is not that one cannot subsist 
without liberty. It is, instead, that one cannot formulate, select, and 
pursue one's own purposes where there is excessive outside interfer-
ence with one's choices, associations, and expression. · 
This suggested rationale comports with familiar traditions of philo-
sophical liberalism. The central liberal assumption is that govern-
ment, when exercising its powers of compulsion, should be neutral on 
how people should value their own pursuits - because that choice 
should be left to individuals themselves. 10 When harm becomes the 
basis for the exercise of state power, therefore, the criterion for harm 
should not prefer one particular set of focal aims a person might select 
over another set. 11 Welfare interests are assigned their degree of im-
portance not because they reflect particular pursuits that are deemed 
superior, but because they are the necessary or virtually necessary pre-
requisite for whatever pursuits an individual may choose. 
Such a rationale does inject potential controversy into the theory 
of harm, for not everyone subscribes to philosophical liberalism. 
Would it not be preferable to have a theory of harm that is less colored 
by a particular moral-philosophical outlook? 
I doubt it. When one ranks interests for the purpose of assessing 
harms, that necessarily is affected by one's deeper moral-philosophical 
assumptions. Someone who seriously wishes to reject liberal assump-
tions - who feels the state should treat some ways a person might live 
his life as superior to others - cannot accept Feinberg's account of 
8. This account of welfare interests resembles Rawlsian "primary goods": prerequisites for 
the pursuit of whatever other aims a person has. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92 (1971). 
9. In speaking of political liberty, I narrow the definition of this welfare interest somewhat; 
Feinberg sees constraints from any source as violating the liberty interest. Pp. 206-14. 
10. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204 (1985). 
11. The most obvious application of this assumption of "neutrality" is to rule out or restrict 
what Feinberg calls "moralistic legal paternalism": coercing the actor to engage in certain con-
duct (or forbidding other conduct) because that conduct is considered a valued (or worthless) 
way of ordering one's life. P. 27. The assumption may, however, be extended to valuation of 
victims' interests for purposes of assessing harm: some particular interests should not be valued 
higher than others merely because they are part of a way of conducting one's life that the state 
deems preferable. The theft of a Vivaldi album should not be considered more harmful than the 
theft of a Prince album on grounds that people should listen to better music. 
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welfare interests, however "impartially" that theory is described. 
Such a person will be drawn to a wholly different theory for ranking 
harms - one that assigns the highest importance to those interests 
that, in his judgment, the state should treat as essential for the supe-
rior modes of living. Better to make the rationale for welfare interests 
as explicit as possible and accept the possibility of disagreement. An 
explicit rationale, as we have seen, helps shed light on what should and 
should not qualify as a welfare interest. Theories of harm, if they are 
to provide any useful guidance to decisionmakers, cannot be ideologi-
cally colorless. 
III 
Notwithstanding the complexities of gauging degrees of harmful-
ness, the harm principle itself is uncontroversial: few would wish to 
deny that harm to others constitutes a legitimate basis for state action. 
When one moves from harm to offense - from injury to exasperation 
- matters become more difficult. Most societies penalize a wide vari-
ety of obnoxious but apparently nonharmful behaviors. While some of 
these prohibitions (such as that against prostitution) might sensibly be 
dispensed with, others seem unavoidable: how could we possibly le-
galize indecent exposure or the public mutilation of corpses? What 
has been perplexing to philosophers is the rationale: why should offen-
sive conduct be forbidden? 12 
The traditional rationale for such prohibitions consisted of 
straightforward appeals to the prevailing mores. Indecent and disgust-
ing conduct infringed the community's standards for appropriate con-
duct: prostitution was lewd, loud public radio playing indecorous, and 
that was that. Such appeals raise troublesome questions, however. 
Why is offensive conduct anything more than a breach of the prevail-
ing taboos? In a free society, how can the majority be entitled to im-
pose its taboos on unwilling minorities? If the conduct injures no one, 
what possible right is there to forbid it? 
One response to such questions has been to deny their premise: 
offense is not as harmless as it seems. Professor Louis B. Schwartz 
took this tack in a well-known essay written two decades ago. 13 Of-
fense, Schwartz maintained, may do no material injury, but neverthe-
less visits psychic harm on the members of its unwilling audience. 
Prohibition of offensive conduct is thus warranted in order to protect 
persons from that psychic harm. Schwartz's argument fit in well with 
12. For previous discussions of offense, see Feif!berg, "Harmless Immoralities" and Offensive 
Nuisances, in ISSUES IN LAW AND MORALITY 83 (N. Care & T. Trelogan eds. 1973); Bayles, 
Comments: Offensive Conduct and the Law, in ISSUES IN LAW AND MORALITY, supra, at 111; 
Ellis, Offense and the Liberal Conception of Law, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 3 (1984); Vandeveer, 
Coercive Restraint of Offensive Actions, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 175 (1979). 
13. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1963). 
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the utilitarianism that was then popular among legal writers. Offen-
sive conduct may be forbidden when its aggregate costs, including the 
displeasure it causes, exceed its measurable social benefits. 14 
Feinberg is too sophisticated to accept such arguments. Offense, 
he rightly recognizes, cannot simply be assimilated into harm: the of-
fended person has no definable, specific interest invaded by the con-
duct, comparable to that invaded when he is harmed. The simple 
utilitarian formula, he also recognizes, would permit far too ambitious 
regulation: it would mean the state could intervene whenever the ag-
gregate irritation from the conduct exceeded its aggregate satisfaction. 
So Feinberg devotes his Offense to Others to rescuing the offense 
principle from its previous defenders. He recognizes that offense is 
analytically distinct from harm, and he repudiates the utilitarian 
formula of merely summing up the satisfactions and dissatisfactions 
produced by the conduct. In its place, Feinberg offers a more complex 
balancing test (pp. 25-49). 
Feinberg's test can briefly be summarized as follows. First, he con-
siders the impact of the conduct, on audience and actor respectively. 
To determine impact on the audience, the magnitude of the offense is 
examined to see how pervasive and intensely it is felt. For that pur-
pose a standard of "reasonable avoidability" is imposed: the easier it 
is for members of the audience to avoid the setting where they will be 
offended by the conduct, the less serious the offense is. The impor-
tance of the offending conduct to the actor is also examined. The 
more central the conduct is to the actor's way of life, the greater is the 
claim not to have the conduct restricted. A standard of "alternative 
opportunities" (the obverse of "reasonable avoidability") is applied 
here: to the extent that there are satisfactory alternative times and 
. places in which performing the conduct would do less offense, the 
claim to performing the conduct at the site where it does offend is 
weakened. 
The second step, after thus considering the audience and the actor, 
is to weigh the broader social impact of the conduct. The more in-
dependent general usefulness the supposedly offending conduct has, 
the less is the claim to prohibition. For this purpose, free expression of 
opinion is (following J.S. Mill) deemed to have its own social value "in 
virtue of the great social utility of free expression and discussion gen-
erally" (p. 44). 
Feinberg's test differs from traditional utilitarianism in that it is 
not purely aggregative. Conduct that widely offends still might be 
protected because of its importance in the lives of a limited number of 
14. Schwartz recommended prohibition only when the conduct is offensive to nearly every-
one, not merely to a majority. His apparent reason for this restriction on the offense principle, 
however, was utilitarian: the need for wide tolerance of minority lifestyles for the smooth func-
tioning of a plural society. Id. 
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persons engaged in it. Instead of weighing net satisfaction and dissat-
isfaction, the test is designed to tilt against prohibition of offensive 
conduct, and the conduct must be very offensive indeed to overcome 
this bias. 
How would Feinberg's test work in practice? In most Western 
countries, not so badly. Public tolerance is likely to be fairly high, so 
behavior will need to be fairly outrageous before it prompts extensive 
offense. Even when conduct would be deemed offensive if publicly 
done, Feinberg's mediating principle of "reasonable avoidability" is 
likely to protect those who engage in it in private.15 While there might 
be rules on public sexual solicitation and on the advertising of pornog-
raphy, not much private conduct is likely to be barred altogether, ex-
cept perhaps such rare and bizarre things as corpse mutilation. 
Yet his theory remains worrisome. In places where taboos are 
stronger and more uniformly held, the scope of prohibition could be 
considerably broader. If private homosexual behavior, or whatever 
else, really did affront the sensibilities of enough people to an intense 
enough degree, it could be barred. Reasonable avoidability is, on 
Feinberg's formula, only a factor to be weighed against the degree and 
intensity of the offense. Feinberg himself admits that if enough people 
were sufficiently shocked at the very idea of such behavior going on 
behind closed doors, it could be prohibited even if privately con-
ducted.16 The formula gives the deviant few little guaranteed scope 
for pursuing unpopular preferences. 
Such hypothetical situations aside, the structure of Feinberg's the-
ory strikes me as vulnerable. His strategy is (1) to treat offense in 
general as a pro tanto reason for possible state intervention, and then 
(2) to introduce "mediating principles" to limit the scope of that inter-
vention. This makes the theory very sensitive to the weight given such 
counterconsiderations. Much depends, for instance, on the emphasis 
placed on Feinberg's "principle of reasonable avoidability": it is that 
mediating principle, largely, that would protect privately conducted 
behavior. If that principle is given slightly less weight in the scale -
or if the definition of "avoidability" is construed more narrowly -
then Feinberg's test would allow the state to intrude much more ambi-
15. Feinberg adds another mediating principle, namely that offended states are to be given 
less weight where they are the result of "abnormal susceptibilities" of the offended persons. Pp. 
33-34. In a society where tolerant attitudes prevail, this principle would restrict the application 
of the offense principle considerably. In a society that is hostile to unorthodox conduct, however, 
it would have little mitigating impact. 
16. Pp. 64-67. Feinberg adds the requirement that the offense, to be prohibitable, must be 
wrongful. Pp. 68-69. This could bar prohibition of "mere knowledge" offenses where the actor is 
unaware of the affront to offstage sensibilities. But where the actor is aware that others will be 
offended by the bare knowledge of his acts - as he may well be if he engages in the acts in an 
environment of low tolerance - and proceeds with the conduct despite that awareness, the 
"wrongfulness" criterion could be satisfied. Feinberg's argument about wrongfulness strikes me 
as somewhat of an expedient for limiting the troublesome implications of his own theory. 
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tiously into private conduct. Yet there is, in his theory, no clearly 
enunciated rationale explaining why his mediating principles are given 
the particular weight and interpretation he would prefer. The balanc-
ing test might thus be acceptable enough in Feinberg's own hands, but 
prove quite threatening in other hands. That leads me to ask whether, 
perhaps, the weakness lies in the basic structure, in conceding that 
offense in general warrants possible state intervention and then trying 
to take most of that concession back through supplementary prin-
ciples. 
IV 
Feinberg retains, from earlier versions of the offense principle such 
as Louis Schwartz's,17 the idea that affronting people's sensibilities is 
in itself reason for invoking the criminal law, if enough people are 
sufficiently affronted. The audience's reasons for feeling affronted are 
irrelevant. Feinberg is quite emphatic that there need be no require-
ment that offense be reasonably taken. In his words: "Provided that 
very real and intense offense is taken predictably by virtually everyone, 
and the offending conduct has hardly any countervailing personal or 
social value of its own, prohibition seems reasonable even when the 
protected sensibilities themselves are not" (p. 36). It is, he says, often 
difficult to explain why one is disgusted by something; and when ex-
planations can be given, they tend to be couched in terms of affronts to 
conventional morality that are not, in Feinberg's view, proper reasons 
for state intervention (pp. 36-38). Offense is thus treated as parallel to 
harm. Just as any harmful conduct is a potential basis for state prohi-
bition because of its harmfulness, so it is with offense (p. 36). 
Treating offense as comparable to harm in this fashion does not 
withstand scrutiny. Harm is an invasion of interest. An interest, as I 
suggested earlier, 18 is something in which one has a stake. It is this 
idea of a stake, a colorable claim, that supplies the reason for objecting 
to harmful conduct. To burn down my house harms me because it 
deprives me of my dwelling place. Offense is different. Not only is the 
state of being offended more transient than that of being injured, but it 
entails no similar notion of a stake, of something of mine on which 
you've intruded. Whatever offends is offensive. The potential scope of 
offense is thus much wider than that of harm. You can harm me only 
by setting back particular interests of mine: by transgressing upon my 
physical person, taking my property, injuring my good name, etc. 
However, anything you choose to do might exasperate me. Hence we 
ordinarily require that, when someone objects to exasperating con-
17. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text. 
18. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
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duct, he give reasons for objecting that are ulterior to the mere fact of 
offense. 
Let us consider this logic in everyday contexts. A shows up in B's 
presence wearing a day-glow orange tie. B objects. In case of harm, 
the harm itself is grounds for objection because it carries its own im-
plicit grounds -A's intrusion in something that is B's. Thus B might 
say: "That's my tie, and you've taken it without permission." But if 
the issue is offense, B's being offended does not imply any similar 
transgression. It is scarcely sufficient for B to say, "Day-glow orange 
ties get on my nerves," for the tie-wearer has no general obligation to 
spare the viewer's nerves. Thus the objector would normally be ex-
pected to supply a reason for objecting, beyond the mere fact of of-
fense. It is true, as Feinberg points out, that he may not be able to 
explain just why garish ties disgust him. What he needs do, however, 
is explain why the actor has a special obligation to avoid doing what 
he, the viewer, finds disgusting. Those reasons may be various. The 
objector may cite a special relationship with the actor that warrants 
regard for the farmer's sensibilities. ("It's our anniversary, and you 
know how I hate day-glow orange.") Or the reason may concern the 
known insulting nature of the conduct to the audience. ("You simply 
can't wear orange to the Hibernian Society Ball on St. Patrick's 
Day.") Or there might be reasons of enforced togetherness warranting 
special attention to others' sensibilities. ("We're stuck on this damned 
submarine together for the next three months, and some of us detest 
day-glow orange.") But if the actor is a stranger to the objector, and 
no such special reasons can be cited, the mere fact that the objector is 
off ended is insufficient. 
While one must be careful when drawing parallels from everyday 
life to public policy, similar reasoning holds. Invasions of interest are 
potentially objectionable because they are such. This is most evident 
with welfare interests. Why should my physical integrity and mini-
mum economic security be protected against invasion? It is because 
those are my vital concerns, essential to carrying on my life. Accumu-
lative interests are more contingent, in that the rules for permitted 
accumulation may vary with the society. Still, it is not hard to argue 
that a person, in order to pursue a worthwhile existence, needs to have 
some manner of accumulation protected. This logic does not carry 
over to offense. Since any conduct of others might offend, a person 
invades no one's legitimate sphere merely because his manner causes 
irritation. In a society in which men customarily wear short hair, the 
wearing of long hair may be considered repulsive, but it is far from 
apparent why such distaste should be the basis for prohibition. 
What, then, could the basis be for regulating offensive conduct? It 
might be useful to follow the structure of ordinary reasoning. It is not 
offense in itself that gives rise to any possible claim to state interven-
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tion, but offense plus. That "plus" is reason why the actor should 
spare the audience's sensibilities. The reasons may differ from_ those 
used in ordinary life, but reason there still should be. This would be 
different from Feinberg's balancing test for offense. Here, establishing 
supporting reasons - the "plus" factor - should be necessary even to 
a prima facie claim to regulation, whereas in Feinberg's balancing test, 
matters such as the pervasiveness and the public nature of the offense 
are merely particular factors, not necessarily decisive ones, in deciding 
upon regulation. 
What kind of reasons come to mind? I can think of three possible 
types. The first is typified by the glue factory built near the residential 
district. Some offensive conduct impedes the quiet enjoyment of spe-
cific interests of specific persons. The glue factory, if the stench is 
strong, affects the habitability of neighbors' dwelling places. This kind 
of claim is restricted to those who have the affected interests and who 
are forced into close and prolonged exposure to the noxious conduct.19 
The conduct must be sufficiently public and intrusive to force its atten-
tion on the affected persons. 
The second kind of reason recalls the orange tie in the submarine. 
Regulation of noxious conduct may be called for in public places 
where people are forced together in close proximity. The idea is not 
protection against unpleasant stimuli, but ensuring comfortable com-
mon access to facilities designed for common use. Everyone in the 
lower east side of Manhattan should be able to enjoy the beauties of 
Stuyvesant Park, not just those who have the stomach to witness pub-
lic sexual acts.20 Most of Feinberg's amusing list of examples of offen-
sive conduct (pp. 10-13) fall into this category. What may be crucial 
to his examples is that they occur on a bus. Much otherwise accepta-
ble conduct might have to be curtailed on the Madison A venue local: 
not only disrobing or sexual intercourse, but handball as well. Here, 
the basis for regulation seems different from that suggested by Fein-
berg's balancing test. Publicness is not just a factor in the scales, but 
an essential part of the reason for regulation. It may, moreover, be the 
degree of enforced mutual proximity, and not merely publicness, that 
provokes the need for a regulatory response. 
Third, regulation of conduct that is not just offensive but insulting 
might conceivably be appropriate. The residents of Skokie did not 
merely happen to have a distaste for Nazi parades ("So ugly and jag-
ged-looked, those Swastikas!"); they had reason to object because the 
conduct was an expression of contempt for them. The idea is that 
19. Feinberg identifies public and private nuisance law as a "model" for his balancing test for 
offense, pp. S-10, concluding that "the offense principle will have to be mediated by balancing 
tests similar to those already employed in the law of nuisance." P. 10. 
20. It has been reported that the Park became, for a time, the scene of public homosexual 
acts. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 29, col. 2; 31, col. 4. 
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people have a special claim against intentional besmirchment, as part 
of what is necessary to preserve their own self-respect. It would not 
suffice that the audience might happen to feel insulted (anything might 
do that) but that the conduct be insulting- i.e., that it can reasonably 
be interpreted as a calculated denigration. Insult raises issues of free 
speech, and it may be necessary to permit a considerable range of in-
sulting symbolic behavior in the interest of freedom of expression. 
(Here, the United States is more permissive than many European 
countries.21) But insult, as contrasted with mere offensiveness, gives 
rise at least to some prima facie claim. 22 
The foregoing three grounds for regulation are considerably more 
restricted than Feinberg's balancing test. All three involve communi-
cated offense - the publicness is part of the very reason for objecting 
to the conduct. This eliminates "bare knowledge" offense - that is, 
private conduct the very idea of which offends others. And the focus 
of the debate shifts from the mere fact and pervasiveness of offense to 
the strength of the particular reasons why the offensive conduct should 
be restrained. 
I do not offer these three grounds for regulation as a finished the-
ory. The reasons I suggest may require reformulation, and there 
might be additional grounds I have missed. I mention them simply to 
illustrate my thesis that the reasons for objecting to offensive conduct 
are critical to the regulation of offense. 
v 
We are brought, finally, to the hard question. Can obnoxious con-
duct ever be barred on "moralistic" grounds - on grounds that it 
violates the customs or mores of a particular society? Feinberg wants 
emphatically to rule this out: "Legal moralism," as he calls it, should 
never be grounds for state intervention; and he devotes his forthcom-
ing volume, Harmless Wrongdoing, 23 to elaborating this thesis. Fein-
berg formulates the offense principle broadly in order to render legal 
moralism unnecessary. Prostitution, pornography, and the like can be 
regulated according to the offense they do to other persons' sensibili-
ties, without need to consider their supposed intrinsic indecency or 
unsuitableness. 
Is Feinberg right in his rejection of legal moralism? I do not have 
a confident answer. One could conceive of a restricted form of legal 
21. Many European countries prohibit explicitly racist speech. See, for example, the West 
German prohibition set forth in STRAFGESETZBUCH § 130 (1982). 
22. When insult is directed at groups instead of individuals, countervailing considerations 
supporting free speech become stronger. Commentary about groups, even if biased or defama· 
tory, approaches the arena of political discourse, where we may not trust the state to be a neutral 
arbiter. 
23. J. FEINBERG, supra note 2. 
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moralism, based on a general ethical theory such as that outlined by 
Stuart Hampshire in his recent Morality and Conflict. 24 This theory 
gives social convention a degree of independent justifying force, pro-
vided the results do not infringe upon stated, overriding principles of 
ethics and justice. However, Hampshire does not apply his theory to 
the particular topic at hand, that of regulating indecent or disgusting 
conduct.25 We also have yet to see Feinberg's forthcoming book, 
which may well contain convincing counterarguments. I thus remain 
agnostic until I have seen the issue more fully argued. 
What troubles me, however, is Feinberg's proposed tradeoff - of 
allowing a broadly defined offense principle, so that we can dispense 
with any need for legal moralism. An offense principle, if broadly de-
fined, can itself be quite threatening to personal choice, since so many 
personal choices can offend others' sensibilities. The alternative Fein-
berg fears may be a lesser evil. Legal moralism may be frightening if 
coupled with an authoritarian theory of the state; but it is not neces-
sarily so when combined with strong limiting principles favoring per-
sonal liberty. There could be a strong presumption against inter-
vention, and only narrowly drawn exceptions in which established so-
cial conventions could be enforced. We could then debate those pro-
posed exceptions and decide either to permit or rule out regulation. 
Little is gained, however, if we rule even a restricted legal moralism 
out of bounds and then accept a much more unrestricted offense the-
ory in order to prohibit unconventional conduct. , 
I would turn Feinberg's strategy on its head: First, I would re-
strict the offense principle much more than Feinberg proposes. Af-
front to sensibility would by itself be no reason for intervention, no 
matter how widely felt. 26 Such affront would be prohibitable only 
when there were special, affirmative reasons warranting intervention 
- reasons such as those I have outlined above concerning the connec-
tion of the offense with the enjoyment of specific interests, the use of 
public facilities designed for common use, or the intentionally insult-
ing nature of the conduct.27 These reasons might be better formu-
lated, but they should relate only to a few, specific subspecies of 
publicly communicated offensive conduct. The offense principle 
should not be made to do the dirty work of legal moralism; offense 
outside these narrow confines should not be used to justify regulating a 
wide variety of behavior traditionally perceived as immoral. 
Second, with a restricted offense principle in place, legal moralism 
could then be argued on its own explicit terms. Conduct, however 
24. S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND CONFLICT 126-69 (1983). 
25. Hampshire presents his view as a general moral theory and does not address the limits of 
state power. 
26. See Part IV supra. 
27. Id. 
714 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:700 
unconventional or shocking, could not be prohibited on mere grounds 
of offensiveness; the case for prohibition, if any exists, would have to 
rest upon the affront to recognized social convention. We would have 
to decide whether that should ever be grounds for prohibition, and, if 
so, how important the particular conventions are and how much their 
preservation would infringe on individual choice.28 As a result of such 
a debate, various bizarre activities could be forbidden, or else would 
have to be tolerated. If the issue is the abuse of corpses, we would 
either decide to prohibit such conduct because certain conventions re· 
la ting to death are preeminently worth preserving, 29 or else tolerate a 
pq1ctice that disgusts us - either because we wish to reject legal mor· 
alism generally, or because we accept it in certain restricted situations 
but not in this kind of case. 
I could imagine living with any of these various solutions. At 
least, the issue of infringing conventional mores would be dealt with 
directly; we would not be prohibiting indecency by masking it as of· 
fense. There would be a deserved skepticism about claims that con· 
duct should be prohibited merely because it is tiresome to others. 
28. Could such a view be consistent with the traditions of liberalism? Feinberg asserts that it 
could not, by definition: liberalism, he asserts, consists in the view that harm-to-others and of-
fense-to-others exhaust the grounds of state intervention, and that paternalistic considerations 
(i.e., harm to self) and legal moralism should carry no weight. HARM TO OTHERS, pp. 14-15. 
This is unpersuasive. Liberalism, surely, does not represent a particular view about harm, 
offense, paternalism, or legal moralism. Rather, it represents a more general view about the 
preeminent importance of personal liberty. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 181-204. It 
should be a matter of argument, not definition, whether a position on these more particular 
subjects is or is not consistent with a high value placed on individual choice. Gerald Dworkin, 
for example, has argued for a restricted form of paternalism, on the basis of notions of autonomy. 
Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 MONIST 64 (1972). His view may or may not be correct, but it seems 
strange to claim his is not a liberal view by definition. 
The same holds for legal moralism. If personal autonomy is given a high value, this would 
rule out a particular form of moralism: namely, moralistic legal paternalism. See note 11 supra. 
There might, however, be a basis for upholding certain social conventions, not on the grounds of 
the moral good of actors themselves, but for the more modest kind of reasons relating to the 
maintenance of certain social conventions, provided the scope of such regulation is stringently 
restricted in order to safeguard a wide scope of personal choice for individuals. Whether any 
legal moralism can be squared with philosophical liberalism cannot be settled by definitional fiat. 
One must, instead, examine the particular form ofmoralism proposed: what its rationale is, how 
extensive or restricted its potential applications are, and how firm the limitations on intervention 
are (to protect actors' personal choices). 
29. Conventions can be backed by deeper reasons. The convention concerning respectful 
treatment of corpses, for example, may be based on ideas of respecting the value of the departed 
person's life. It might still be overridden by personal rights arguments. For example, the con-
vention concerning corpses should not be used to forbid unusual religious ceremonies regarding 
death. But where that is not the case, the state might legitimately prohibit certain dealings with 
corpses on grounds of the convention of respectful treatment. An example of prohibited conduct 
might be relatives' selling of the corpse for use for certain purposes. 
